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THE LEIBNIZIAN "CIRCLE" 
by Fabrizio Mondadori 
"One should always be a little improbable," 0. Wilde. 
0. Honni soit qui mat y pense. 
Let me start with a word of caution: there is no (vicious) circularity in the 
Leibnizian "circle." Certainly not the same kind of (allegedly vicious) circu- 
larity one can find, or  Arnauld thought he had found,' in a more famous 
circle-the Cartesian circle. For one thing, as we shall see later the Leibnizian 
"circle" (what I call the "circle7' proper in §1 below) is the distinguishing trait 
of the grand circular design Leibniz-unlike Descartes-very likely meant 
his metaphysical "system" to be-which is definitely not true of the Cartesian 
circle with respect to Descartes's own metaphysical system. For another, 
whereas Descartes was clearly not aware of the Cartesian circle, I suspect that 
Leibniz was perfectly conscious of the Leibnizian "circle"-but this is only a 
(bold) conjecture on my part. 
I should add, however, that I am not really convinced that it is appropriate 
to employ the notion of a "circle" (i.e., roughly, of an argument whose con- 
clusion appears among its prernisses)-except perhaps in a purely Pickwickian 
sense thereof; hence the quotes around "circle" both in the title and in the text: 
"family of interconnected (and/ or interdefinable) notions/ doctrines1 theories 
. . ." looks like a more accurate and less tendentious terminology. Later on I 
shall want to distinguish between the "circle" proper and the family of inter- 
connected (and/or  interdefinable) notions/doctrines/theories. For the 
moment let me simply use the phrase "Leibnizian circleVto refer to a "family" 
of interconnected notions, doctrines, etc., whose members I shall now proceed 
to enumerate: the doctrine of (universal) Harmony; the theory of complete 
concepts; the notion of a complete concept; the notion of expression; the 
notion of connection; the notion of compossibility; and the mirroring prin- 
ciple. (For obvious reasons, the order is unimportant.) 
What is the philosophical and metaphysical significance of the Leibnizian 
"circle"? Very likely, at least the following: one's (I mean, Leibniz's) descrip- 
tion, and understanding, of reality-of the World-has no natural ultimate 
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starting point (except perhaps the assumption that each individual substance 
exemplifies a complete concept, or the attendant view that monads are the 
stuff reality is made on); no natural middle point; and no end point whatsoever. 
In other words, between the notions, doctrines, etc., one (I mean, Leibniz) 
employs in order t o  describe and understand reality, roughly the same trade- 
off obtains that Frege thought obtained between the meaning of a sentence 
and the meanings of its constituents. Frege's celebrated and often misinter- 
preted dictum (that "Only in the context of a sentence does a word have a 
meaning"), and the complementary view (also Frege's) that the meaning of a 
sentence is a function of the meanings of its constituents, are partly explicated 
by Dummett in the following way: 
in the order of explanal!on the sense of a sentence is primary, but in the order of recognlrron 
the sense of a word is primary . . . we understand [a] sentence-grasp its sense-by 
knowing the senses of its constituents, and, as  ~t were, compounding them in a w a y  that is 
determined by the manner in which the words themselves are put together to form the 
sentence. We thus derive our knowledge of the sense of any given sentence from our 
prevlous knowledge of the senses of the words that compose it, together with our observa- 
tlon of the way in which they are combined in that sentence. It is this which I intended to  
express by saying that, for Frege, the sense of a word IS pnmary, and that of a sentence 
secondary, in the order of recognition:. . . But, when we come togiveany general explana- 
tion of what it is for sentences and words to have a sense, that is, ofwhat it is for us tograsp 
their sense, then the order of prionty IS reversed. For Frege, the sense of a word or of any 
expression not a sentence can be understood only as consistingin thecontribution which ~t 
makes to determining the sense of any sentence in which it may occur.. . . If thls is so, then, 
on paln of circularity, the general notion of the sense possessed by a sentence must be 
capable of be~ng explained w~thout  reference to the notion of the senses of constituent 
words or  expressions. This is possible via the conception of truth-cond~tions . . . .2 
Something more than a mere analogue of the trade-off between the meaning 
of a sentence and the meanings of its constituents, however, is involved in the 
Leibnizian "circle"-and not just because so many more notions (doctrines, 
etc.) belong to the latter; but essentially because each of the notions, doctrines, 
etc., that are members of the "circle" sends you around to most, if not all, of 
the remaining notions, doctrines, etc.: there is no way of breaking out of the 
"circfe." Thus, for instance, the mirroring principle sends you around to the 
notion of compossibility, which in turn sends you around to that of expres- 
sion, which in turn sends you around to that of connection, which in turn 
sends you around to the mirroring principle, . . , and so on. . . . 
Or, to borrow Dummett's terminology: on pain of circularity, the notion 
of compossibility must be capable of being explained (or accounted for), but 
it is not, without reference to the mirroring principle. On pain of circularity, 
the notion of expression must be capable of being explained (or accounted 
for), but it is not, without reference to the notion of connection. On pain of 
circularity, the view that the concepts exemplified by actual individual 
substances are complete and mutually compossible must be capable of being 
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explained (or accounted for), but it is not, without reference to the view that 
the universe expressed by each individual substance is the same. And so on; 
and so forth. 
This maze of interconnected loops is more or less what I mean by the 
Leibnizian "circle": the "family" of interconnected notions, doctrines, etc., 
enumerated above, And here one is almost tempted to say: Honnisoit quirnal 
ypense-if the notion of a "circle" is taken in a derogatory sense. Let me now 
provide a more detailed analysis of the various components of the "circley'/ 
"family." How they interrelate and their interdefinability will be described at 
a later stage of the paper. 
0.1. The theory of complete concepts. 
To begin with a negative point: Leibniz explicitly rejected the view that a 
complete concept is made up of all the properties of the individual exemplifying 
it. His view, rather, was that 
all the predicates of Adam depend or  d o  not depend upon other predicates of the same 
Adam. Settlng aside . . . those that d o  not depend upon others, one has only to consider 
together all the basic predicates In order to form the complete concept of Adam adequate 
to deduce from it everything that IS ever to  happen to him. ( C A ,  48; cf. also C A ,  44,46) 
What amounts to pretty much the same view can also be found in the 
following passage from the Discourse: 
God seeing the individual notion. . . of Alexander sees in it at  the same time the foundation 
and reason of all the predicates that can be truly said of him. (DM, 13) 
So the idea is: the set of all the properties of a(ny) given individual substance 
s contains a proper subset from which the remaining properties of s can 
somehow be deduced or inferred. (The same, or roughly the same, picture, 
one gets from Leibniz's talk of a "law of the continuation of the series," in L, 
360, 458, 500, 504, 537.) The subset in question is precisely what Leibniz 
refers to  as the "complete concept"exemp1ified by s, whereas the "law of the 
series" just alluded to is best regarded as the counterpart in actuality to the 
given complete concept in the realm of possibility. 
It should also be added that on Leibniz's view (a) each individual substance 
exemplifies exactly one complete concept (and conversely, each exempli- 
fied complete concept is exemplified by exactly one individual substance), the 
concept in question constituting the essence of the substance in question (see 
DM, 21; CA, 45,47); (b) (= the mirroring principle) each completeindividual 
concept "mirrors" (in a sense to  be explained in g0.2 below) all the other 
complete individual concepts in a given (possible) world3 (see for example 
C, 15,19),4 so that each individual substance can be said to express the whole 
universe from its own point of view; and (c) one of the consequences of the 
fact that the concept of each individual substance is complete is that each 
individual substance expresses the whole universe from its own point of view 
(cf. CA, 145-146; DM, 14). (We shall see below that it makes perfectly good 
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sense to take completeness t o  "imply," a t  least in part, "mirroring," so that 
(b) and (c) turn out to be virtually equivalent.) 
As I have shown elsewhere,5 (a) has the rather startling consequence that 
all the properties of a given individual substance are essential to it: or, in 
possible-worlds terms, that no actual individual substance can exist in more 
than one possible world-and hence, in particular, that n o  complete indi- 
vidual concept does in fact belong t o  more than one possible world. 
This, in a nutshell, is the theory of complete concepts. Two important 
questions have been sidestepped, however, etpour cause(they raise problems 
which fortunately lie outside the scope of the present paper): first, What sort 
of properties should be regarded as belonging to  the complete concept exem- 
plified by a given individual substance? And second, D o  the properties in 
question include relational properties as  well? I have no definite answer to the 
first question: but a plausible guess is that each complete individual concept 
contains a t  least a number of individual, as well as generic, essential properties6 
-plus the laws of the universe to which the individual substance possessing 
those properties belongs (see CA,  43, 55, 56). Whether the latter are indeed 
sufficient, together with the laws, for the derivation of the remaining properties 
of the substance (indeed, of the entire universe) in question, is not a t  all clear: 
perhaps something more might (or ought to) be put into the complete 
concept. If so, what it is that has to be added remains (to me at  least) pretty 
much of a mystery. For instance, should relational properties be taken to  
belong to the complete concept exemplified by a given individual substance? 
This was our second question. And again, the answer to it unfortunately can- 
not be as definite as one would like it to be: my view, however, in spite of 
what I may seem to have implied above and of (b) of a couple of paragraphs 
back, is that o n  Leibniz's view they should not be taken to be members of 
complete individual concepts-whether exemplified or  not.' So much for the 
two sidestepped questions and the problems they raise: let me now turn to an 
analysis of the notion of compossibility. 
0.2. Compossibility. 
What is it for each complete individual concept t o  "mirror" all the other 
complete individual concepts in a given (possible) world? To  answer this 
question and to provide an account of the notion of compossibility is, I 
should like to suggest, pretty much the same thing. But this is not all. A 
consequence of the mirroring principle was, it will be recalled, that each 
individual substance can be said to  express the whole unive~se (world) from 
its own point of view. Does this imply that compossibility is (part of) what 
enables a given individual substance to express the whole universe (world) 
from its own point of view? Notice that once we have answered this question 
we will be in a position to explain (at least in part: for we still have to provide 
an account of the notion of expression) why each individual substance 
expresses the whole universe (world) from its own point of view as a result of 
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each (exemplified) complete individual concept's "mirroring" all the other 
(exemplified) individual concepts. We will also be in a position to  provide 
some evidence for my claim in 90.1 above that completeness implies, a t  least 
in part, "mirroring." 
Well then: what is "compossible" true of? That is, more accurately: what is 
going to fill the bIanks in "--- is compossible with -"? The obvious 
answer is: singular terms denoting or naming complete concepts (or variables 
ranging over complete concepts). Thus suppose we have a statement of the 
form, "a is compossible with P," where "a" and "PWdenote or  namecomplete 
concepts. Under what conditions is it true? Following a suggestion due to 
Benson ~ a t e s , '  we might suggest that it is true just in case a and /3 belong to 
the same possible world, or just in case the individuals, if any, exemplifying 
them inhabit the same world-but this does not appear to throw much light 
on the meaning (in some intuitive sense of "meaning") of "compossible." 
What we need is a n  analysis of "compossib1e"from which it,follows that "a is 
compossible with P" is true just in case a and ,3 are members of the same 
possible world: and what we want is an independent characterization of (the 
notion of) compossibility. I propose the following.' 
We might say (CI) that to claim that, for any complete individualconcepts 
x a n d  JJ, x and y are (mutually) compossible is to  claim that, for any property 
4, if ql is a member ofy (respectively, x), then it is possible (I mean, objectivel-v 
possible) to deduce from x (respectively, y) that 4 is a member of J, (respec- 
tively, x); and (C2) that to  claim that, for any complete individual concepts x 
and y, x is not compossible with y is to claim that there is a property 4 such 
that 4 is a member of y and it is not possible to deduce from x that ql is a 
member of y. Given (C 1) and (C2), it is quite natural to proceed to characterize 
a possible world as a set of mutually compossible complete concepts-in the 
sense of "compossibIe" I have just explained. A statement such as  "a is 
compossible with 0" would then be true just in case a and P belong to  the same 
possible world-which is precisely the result we wanted. 
Is there any reason a t  all, however, for supposing that Leibniz would have 
regarded (Cl) and (C2) of the previous paragraph as (satisfactory) explications 
of the notion of compossibility? Well, if, a s  I have suggested above, compos- 
sibility is indeed what makes "mirroring" possible (and conversely, in a way), 
then (Cl) and (C2) are fully justified. For  they can be taken to imply, in 
particular, that each exemplified complete concept '"mirrors" all the other 
exemplified complete concepts. Compossibility, then, is (part of) what makes 
"mirroring" possible: it is also what allows it to  have the meaning it most 
likely has in Leibniz's metaphysics-viz., t o  say that a given (exemplified) 
complete concept "mirrors" all the other (exemplified) complete concepts 
is to say that it is possible (objectively possible, I mean) to deduce from the 
former all the properties belonging to  the latter. Further, since the theory of 
complete concepts entails, among other things (see 50.1 above), that  each 
74 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
complete individual concept "mirrors" a11 the other complete individual 
concepts in a given(possib1e) world, we also have a way of accounting for (Cl) 
and (C2): quite simply, (Cl) and (C2) are required by the theory of complete 
concepts itself. 
We already have some sort of "circle" here. On the one hand, (C1)and (C2) 
appear to acquire whatever sense they have from the mirroringprinciple (that 
is, there would be little or no justification for them in the absence of some- 
thing like the principle in question). On the other hand, (Cl)  and (C2) account 
for, and make possible the application of, the principle itself (that is, there 
would be little or no justification for the mirroring principle in the absence of 
something like (Cl)  and (C2), i.e., in the absence of something like the notion 
of compossibility). 
At this point we are just about ready t o  answer the question I raised at the 
beginning of the present section-namely: Is compossibility (part of) what 
enables a given individual substance to express the same universe (world) 
from its own point of view? The answer should be fairly obvious: it most 
certainly is-at least in view of the facts (1) that, as we have just seen, it is so 
intimately associated with the mirroring principle, and (2) that, as  we shall 
presently see, the mirroring principle is itself responsible for each individual 
substance's expressing the whole universe (world) from its own point of view. 
(A slightly different account of "- expresses -" will be provided in 
60.3 below.) 
Now for the other question I raised a t  the beginning of the present section- 
namely: Why does each actual individual substance express the whole 
universe (world) from its own point of view as a result of each complete 
individual concept's "mirroring" all the other individual concepts exemplified 
in our own world? Well, we know what it is for a given complete concept c to 
"mirror" all the other complete concepts in a given (possible) world: roughly, 
it is for all the properties contained in them to be deducible from c. 
We also know, from 60.1 above, that each (actual) individual substance 
exemplifies exactly one complete concept (and conversely, that each exempli- 
fied complete concept is exemplified by exactly one individual substance). 
More precisely, in view of the mirroring principle we know that each(actua1) 
individual substance exemplifies a complete individual concept which 
"mirrors" (in the sense explained above) all the complete individual concepts 
exemplified in our world. 
At this point the answer to our question is not hard to find: since, as we have 
just seen, ( I )  each (exemplified) complete concept "mirrors" all the other 
(exemplified) complete concepts,'O and (2) each individual substance exem- 
plifies exactly one complete concept (and each exemplified complete concept 
is exemplified by exactly one individual substance), it follows that each 
individual substance expresses the universe (world) from its own point of 
view-which assumes, and rightly so, I believe (see $0.3 below), that the 
THE LEIBNIZIAN "CIRCLE" 75 
notion of expression is understood in terms of that of deducibility via the 
completeness of concepts. 
This now brings me to the third point I raised at the beginning of the 
present section: I mean the claim that the completeness of concepts implies, at  
least in part (and in some intuitive sense of "implies"), the mirroring principle. 
The following passages appear to provide a certain amount of textual evidence 
for the claim I have just made: 
Every indivrdual substance rnvolves the whole universe in its perfect [i.e., complete] 
concept. . . . (L, 269; see also L, 524-525) 
. . . it is in the nature of an individual substance to  have such a complete concept, whence 
can be inferred everything that one can attribute to it,andeven the whole universe because 
of the connexions between things. (CA, 44) 
The first of the two passages just quoted can plausibly be taken to mean 
that from the "perfect" (i.e., complete: see L, 268) concept of a given individual 
substance it is possible to deduce all the properties of all the individual sub- 
stances inhabiting our own world. But this is just another and more compli- 
cated way of saying that each (exemplified) complete concept "mirrors" all the 
other (exemplified) complete concepts. What makes the deduction, and hence 
the "mirroring," possible (only in part, however, since completeness does not 
guarantee compossibility, and the mirroring principle only applies to  sets of 
mutually cornpossible complete concepts) is the fact that the concepts exem- 
plified by individual substances are complete: it is precisely this which I 
intended to express by saying that the completeness of concepts "entails," at  
least in part, the mirroring principle. If we bring into the picture either the 
notion of compossibility, or that of connection (see below), we can easily get 
rid of the qualification, "at least in part": so that the mirroring principle turns 
out to be a consequence either of the completeness and mutual compossibility 
of (exemplified) individual concepts, or  of the completeness of (exemplified) 
individual concepts and of the view that all things are connected. 
Things are definitely slightly more complicated when it comes to interpreting 
the second of the two passages quoted a couple of paragraphs back. Compli- 
cations or not, I suggest that the passage under present analysis might be 
regarded as a more precise formulation of the view put forth in the first, a t  
least owing to the fact that the notion of completeness is now supplemented 
with that of connection (between things). The picture we get can be described 
thus: main assumption: each individual substance is connected with all other 
individual substances. Since however each individual substance exemplifies a 
concept from which "everything that one can attribute to it" is deducible, and 
since one of the things that can be attributed to  it is (given theabove assump- 
tion) that, e.g., it is connected in such-and-such a way with such-and-such a 
substance, one of the items deducible from the complete concept of a given 
individual substance is precisely that it is connected in such-and-such a way 
76 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
with such-and-such a substance. Each "type" of connection-whether between 
a given substance s and a different substances', or between s and The FIoating 
Opera, or between s and the everlasting trace of the bright, the droll, the 
charming things you and I like to  remember-will obviously produce one 
more item to be deduced from the complete concept of a given individual 
substance. Assuming that this picture is coherent (see note 11 below), it is easily 
seen that, if we allow for enough "types" of connections, we shall quickly 
describe (as well as derive) the entire universe: and hence that what accounts 
for the mirroring principle is the completeness of concepts-plus, in the 
present case, what Leibniz calls (in DM, 13) the "connection of things." 
At this point an interesting problem arises (a side-effect, as we shall see in 
$40.5 and 1, of the Leibnizian "circle"). I have said in the previous paragraph 
that the second of the two passages just discussed might be regarded as a 
"more precise" formulation of the view put forth in the first. It was a very 
weak and somewhat optimistic "might," however: for that passage is in fact 
neither a moreprecise formulation, nor a formulation, whether precise or not, 
of the view in question. For, speaking with "metaphysical rigour" (to borrow 
one of Leibniz's pet phrases-see, e.g., L, 269), there could possibly be no 
connections between substances before substances are created, that is, before 
the corresponding complete concepts are exemplified. But if there could 
possibly be no connections between substances before substances are created, 
what does it mean to say that from the complete concept exemplified by a 
given individual substance "can be inferred . . . the whole universe because of 
the connexions between things" (italics mine)-since whatever properties 
(relational as well as nonrelational) a substance has, follow from its complete 
concept? On the view that all the properties a given individual substance 
possesses are deducible from its complete concept, the "connexions between 
things" ought to be a consequence of the completeness of concepts; and not, 
there being no  connections between substances before substances are 
created, part of what accounts for it, and hence for the fact that the "whole 
universe" can be inferred from any given (exemplified) complete concept. 
(See note 11 below, however.) 
The obvious way out of the problem is to  say that Leibniz was being sloppy, 
careless, or what have you, in the passage under present analysis: but this still 
leaves us with the interesting question, Is there a way of making sense of what 
he says in that passage? What we want is a way of making sense which (a) does 
not conflate the two levels Leibnizappears toconflate(in $0.5 below I refer to 
them as the "level" of possibility, i.e., roughly, that of complete concepts, and 
the "level" of actuality, i.e., roughly, that of the substances exemplifying the 
concepts in question), and (b) saves as much as possible of the spirit, if not the 
letter, of Leibniz's claim. I suggest the following.ll 
Since, as I have pointed out a couple of paragraphs back, there can be no 
connections between substances before substances are created, the connec- 
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tions we are after must be connections between complete concepts (or else 
derivable from them): there is no other choice. But what type of connection? 
Again, there is only one choice: to say of two complete concepts that they are 
connected is to say that they are mutually compossible. The type of connection 
between complete concepts we are after, then, is provided by (the relation of) 
compossibility. 
In view of the way in which I have characterized above (the notion of) 
compossibiIity, it now becomes possible to make sense of Leibniz's claim that 
from the complete concept exemplified by a given actual individual substance 
"can be inferred . . . the whole universe because of the connexions between 
things." Here the "connexior$s] between things" is just the counterpart in the 
actual world to the compossibility between the concepts exemplified by the 
things (substances) in question. The latter, indeed, is readily seen to be what 
accounts for the former: it is precisely because any two exemplified complete 
concepts are compossible that the individual substances exemplifying them 
can be said to be connected;'2 thus the view that all individual substances are 
connected turns out to be a fairly natural consequence of the view that the 
(complete) individual concepts exemplified by them are mutually compossible. 
But to return to the mirroring principle. Its (metaphysical) underpinnings 
are provided by the completeness and mutual compossibility of exemplified 
individual concepts (or else by the former and the view that all things are 
connected)-at least given the interpretation of Leibniz's passage I have 
suggested above. We have something like the following picture: completeness 
and compossibility jointly account for the mirroring principle; completeness 
and the mirroring principle, in turn, jointly provide some sort of Lebensraum 
for compossibility-that is, there would be little or no point to the claim that 
two concepts are compossible unless (a) the concepts in question are complete 
and (b) the mirroring principle holds. 
This is one more instance (within a single interpretation) of the Leibnizian 
"circlew-more of a well-behaved family, so far, than of a vicious circle. Still, 
the tight interconnection between-if not straight interdefinability of-the 
various components of the family is characteristically there, each of the 
notions/doctrines, etc., in the family sending you around to one or more of 
the remaining ones-this much at least we are slowly but steadily beginning 
to see. To this effect, consider for instance the following passage, which 
brings together some of the notions I have been talking about in the previous 
pages: 
Now t h ~ s  mutual connection or accommodation of all created things to each other and of 
each to all the rest causes each single substance to  have relations which express all the 
others and consequently to be a perpetual l iv~ng mirror of the universe, ( L ,  648-italics 
mine) 
Exactly what to make of the passage I have just quoted is somewhat of a 
problem: but perhaps the following (partial) interpretation will do: the 
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"mutual connection . . . of all created things to each other" should simply be 
regarded as a result of the complete concepts exemplified by "all created 
things" being mutually cornpossible (see notes 11 and 12, however). This 
enables us to regard relations, in particular, as directly "reducible" to com- 
possibility (and ultimately to completeness), and the mirroring principle, as 
applied to actual substances (Leibniz's "living mirrors") rather than to the 
concepts they exemplify, as a result of the completeness plus the mutual 
compossibility of concepts. Some of this we have already seen. (We have also 
seen, it will be recalled, that the interpretation I have just proposed can be 
turned upside down-without, it should be pointed out, appreciably altering 
the overall picture: it is only a question of perspective.) A question however 
remains: How should we understand the notion of expression? 
0.3. Expression. 
What I take to be Leibniz's "definitive" view concerning the relation 
between the notion of a complete concept and that of expression (at least in- 
sofar as the latter occurs in the context "-- is an expression of the whole/ 
same universe") is contained in the following passage: 
By the concept of substance or  complete entity in general, which implies that its present 
state is always a natural consequence of its preceding state, it follows that the nature of 
every ~ndividual substance . . . is to express the universe. (CA, 145-146: see also CA, 64; 
DM, 14; L, 71 1-712) 
Nothing particularly surprising in the view that the present state of a given 
substance s is a natural consequence of its preceding state: that view is itself 
a natural consequence of the fact that s exemplifies a complete concept, 
whereof the entire history of s is itself a necessary consequence (cf. also CA, 
170, and G0.4 below). What is somewhat surprising, on the other hand, is that 
the fact that each individual substance exemplifies a complete concept should 
be said to entail that each individual substance expresses the (whole) universe 
(which is part of what I take Leibniz to  be saying in the passage under present 
analysis).I3 Why should this be so? In order to answer this question, we shall 
first have to answer another, equally tricky and somewhat elusive question: 
What is expression? Or better, since "expression" and "expresses"are usually 
defined in context by Leibniz: What is it for one individual substance to 
express another individual substance (or the whole universe, for that matter)? 
On Leibniz's view, "One thing expresses another . . . when there exists a 
constant and fixed relationship between what can be said of one and of the 
other" (CA, 144). 
I am not going to provide a full-fledged analysis of what Leibniz means by 
this definition-that is, an analysis which takes care of all the contexts wherein 
LC- expresses -" or "- is an expression of -" can meaningfully 
occur (according to Leibniz): nor shall I try to provide an explanation of 
Leibniz's other (contextual) definitions of "expresses" and "expression" (see 
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e.g. C, 15; L, 206). Rather, I shall try only to interpret the above definition for 
the contexts wherein the blanks in "- expresses -" and "- is an 
expression of -" are filled by "Each individual substance" and "the whole 
(or: the same) universe," respectively (how to extend the interpretation I 
suggest below to contexts wherein "the whole universe" is replaced by "every 
other substance" will be pretty obvious). 
The interpretation I should like to propose is fairly simple, and has the 
merit (if indeed it is a merit) of making almost trivial Leibniz's view that each 
individual substance expresses the whole universe as a result of exemplifying 
a complete concept.14 To begin with, the claim that each individual substance 
expresses the whole universe can be understood to mean that there is a 
"constant and fixed relationship between what can be said of one and of the 
otherw-"the one," "the other," and the "what" being a given individual 
substance, the whole universe, and whatever properties pertain to both of 
them, respectively. In other words, and more precisely: we should answer the 
question, When does a given individual substance express the whole universe? 
by saying, with Leibniz, When there is a "constant and fixed relationship 
between what can be said of one and of the other." 
This of course raises the next obvious question, When is there such a 
"constant and fixed relationship"? Or: What is it for there to be such a "constant 
and fixed relationship"? Well, given (1) that'kan be said of '  can naturally and 
not implausibly be understood in the sense of "is true of," (2) that the "rela- 
tionship" involved here is clearly a relationtship) of deducibility (of the 
properties of the whole universe from those of the substance "expressing" it), 
and (3) that in the present case deducibility is deducibility via complete 
concepts, the when-question can easily be answered as follows: When what 
can be said (i.e., is true) of the whole universe is deducible from what can be 
said (i.e., is true) of a given individual substance s via the complete concept 
exemplified by s. An equally easy answer will do for the what-question (I leave 
to the reader the far easier task of finding it). 
Now, if expression is a matter of a "constant and fixed relationship" 
between two "entitiesn-namely, each individual substance and the whole 
universe; if "constant and fixed relationship," in turn, is a matter of deduci- 
bility; and, finally, if deducibility is a matter of the completeness of concepts; 
then that each individual substance exemplifies a complete concept is not only 
what enables it to express the entire universe. It is what accounts for, and 
entails, its expressing the whole (which, unless compossibility is brought into 
the picture, need not mean: the same) universe. 
This is not the whole story, however. For we want to  be able to say, notjust 
that each individual substance expresses the whole universe: but also, and 
more significantly, that each individual substance expresses the same universe. 
How are we going to be able to  say the latter? Well, this much at least we 
know: in order for a given individual substance s to express the whole-and 
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not, mind you: the same-universe, all that is needed is that the concept 
exemplified by s be complete. What has to be added? Easy: compossibility- 
the concepts exemplified by actual individual substances must be complete 
and mutually compossible. Thus to say that a11 individual substances express 
the same universe is to say that the concepts exemplified by themarecomplete 
and mutually compossible: completeness guarantees deducibility; compossi- 
bility, in turn, guarantees sameness of universe (see 80.2 above). What 
accounts for expression (of the same universe by all actual individual sub- 
stances), then, is the completeness and mutual compossibility of exemplified 
individual concepts. And what makes possible the step from "expression of 
the same" to "expression of the whole" is the fact that compossibility implies 
-at least given the way in which I have characterized it on p. 73 above- 
completeness, so that an individual substance which expresses the same 
universe expressed by all other substances will automatically express the 
whole universe. 
(If this is so, and, further, if the "extrinsic denominations" of a given 
individual substance belong to it, as Leibniz says, "only by virtue of the 
general connexion of thingsand of the fact that it is an expression of the entire 
universe after its own manner" [CA,  631, then that a given individual substance 
has "extrinsic denominations" is a result of the fact that it exemplifies a 
complete concept-together with the fact that the latter is compossible with 
all other exemplified complete conceprs.15 But this is just another way of 
saying that the "extrinsic denominations" of a given individual substance s 
have their "basis" in-are uItimately "reducible" to-the properties making 
up the complete concept of s. Further textual evidence for this claim is pro- 
vided by the following passage-provided "express" is understood in the way 
I have suggested above: "things which differ in position must express their 
position, that is, their surroundings, and hence are not to be distinguished 
merely by their location or by a solely extrinsic denomination . . ." [L, 5291.) 
But let me make a couple of more points on the notion of expression. Since, 
as we have just seen, the latter is most plausibly explicated by employing the 
notions of completeness (of concepts) and compossibility, it is not that 
implausible, ifwe take it as primary, to  suggest that individual substances are 
connected by virtue of the fact that they all express the same universe. In a 
sense, therefore, connection is a special-indeed, a very special-kind of 
expression: no connection, we might say, without expression-especially if 
we bear in mind (a) that connection is the analogue in actuality of compossi- 
bility in the realm of possibility (cf. $0.2 above), and (b) that each statement of 
connection is an attribution of a property to a given individual substance, and 
hence requires (given Leibniz's definition of truth) that the concept exemplified 
by that substance be complete. 
Now for the second point. In  $0.2 above I claimed that what accounts for 
(the principle of) mirroring is that the concepts exemplified by individual 
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substances are complete and mutually compossible. In the present section I 
have said pretty much the same thing of the notion of expression(of the same 
universe by all individual substances). What distinguishes, then, mirroring 
from expressing? Very simply, this: what fills the blanks in "- mirrors-" 
are "each complete concept" and "all the other complete concepts in the same 
(possible) world," respectively; whereas what fills the blanks in "- expresses 
----" are "each individual substance" and "the whole] same universe," 
respectively. In a word: we may look upon expression as the counterpart for 
an actualized world to mirroring for a "merely" possible world. (If, on the 
other hand, we apply the mirroring principle to actual individual substances, 
rather than to the concepts they exemplify, mirroring may be conceived of as 
a species of expression, and the distinction between them will accordingly 
virtuaIly disappear. See, e.g., C, 15.) 
0.4. (Universal) Harmony. 
S o  far I have been employing "expresses" almost exclusively in the context 
"each individual substance expresses the whole universe (from its own point 
of view)." What if we were to replace "whole" by "same" in that context? We 
would get Leibniz's celebrated doctrine of (universal) Harmony-or some- 
thing pretty much like it. Consider, for instance, the following passage: 
The hypothesis of concomitance or  harmony betweensubstances fottows from what I have 
sald about each ~ndividual substance embracing for everall the accidents that will occur to  
it and being an expression after its own manner of the whole universe. (CA, 86-italics 
mine; see also CA,  64) 
But this is not exactly what we were after. For the fact that each individual 
substance is an expression after its own manner of the whole universe does not 
imply-nor does it guarantee-that it is an  expression after its own manner of 
the same universe. The (whole) universe expressed by each substance may 
well be a portion of a larger region-a polyverse, a "grand" universe- 
containing as many mutually disjoint universes as  there are individual sub- 
stances,'6 in which case there would be no way of getting from "expression of 
the whole" to "expression of the same." In order to be able to  get from the 
former to the latter, we have to bring into the picture the notion of compossi- 
bility: compossibility and the view that each individual substance expresses 
the whole universe after its own manner jointly imply the view that each 
individual substance expresses the same universe (polyverse?). 
Clearly, then, the spirit-if not literally the letter-of what we were after is 
contained in the following passage: "all simple substances will always have 
a harmony among themselves because they always represent [i.e., express] the 
same universe" (L, 71 1-712-italics mine; see also L, 651, and GPVII, 31 1). 
Given the way in which I have explained the notion of expression in $0.3 
above, (universal) Harmony can be regarded as a natural consequence of the 
completeness and mutual compossibility of the concepts exemplified by 
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actual individual substances. And even if it turned out that it is possible to 
give an analysis of the notion of expression in which no reference is made to 
the notion of compossibility (see for instance $1 below), the latter would be 
needed anyway. For, as we have just seen, compossibility is precisely what 
enables Leibniz to take the quite crucial step from the claim that each individual 
substance expresses the whole universe to the claim that each individual 
substance expresses the same universe. That is, unless our own universe 
(world) were a set of mutually compossible exemplified complete concepts, 
there would be no way for Leibniz to take the step from the former to the 
latter claim:" as I have pointed out above, the universe expressed by each 
individual substance might well be a region of a larger universe containingas 
many mutually disjoint universes, each of them belonging (we may suppose) 
to a different spatio-temporal dimension, as there are individual substances. 
Compossibility is what rules out this possibility. And (universal) Harmony, 
we can now safely repeat, is essentially a question of each individual substance's 
expressing the same universe from its own point of view. 
But things are not just that simple and easy. The following passages, for 
instance, flatly contradict not only the claim I have just made, but also (and 
more dramatically) both of the passages I have quoted in the past few para- 
graphs: 
Yet he [Bayle] was unable to set forth any reason why this universal Harmony, which results 
In every substance expressing all the others by means of the relations it has with them, 
should be ~mpossible. (L, 648-italics mine) 
. . . this expression occurs everywhere, because every substance is in harmony with every 
other. ( C A ,  144-italics mine; see also CA, 87) 
The situation does not look very promising.18 On the one hand, Leibniz 
definitely maintains that the fact that each individual substance expresses the 
same universe from its own point of view follows from the fact that (universal) 
Harmony holds: this we have just seen. On the other hand, he also definitely 
maintains that the fact that (universal) Harmony holds follows from the fact 
that each individual substance expresses the same universe from its own point 
of view: this we have seen a while ago. He may well have wanted to hold both 
views at the same time: that is, he may have been consciously responsible for 
what I have called the Leibnizian "circle"-and this looks a little more 
promising. 
In fact, it is (almost) possible to hold both views at the same time, still 
saving the "circle," but in a slightly less overtly circular way, as follows: to 
claim that (universal) Harmony holds is to claim that each individual substance 
expresses the same universe from its own point of view-and conversely: to 
claim that each individual substance expresses the same universe from its own 
point of view is to claim that (universal) Harmony holds. (This becomes 
somehow obvious, in some non-standard sense of "obvious,'"9 as  soon as we 
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distinguish-as I have done a few paragraphs back-between the assertion 
that each individual substance expresses the whole universe from its own 
point of view, and the assertion that each individual substance expresses the 
same universe from its own point of view. Clearly the latter implies the 
former: but not conversely, as  I have shown above.) 
Do we have an independent way of explaining the notion of "the same 
universe," so as to  make the "circle" even less overtly circular? Perhaps the 
following explanation will do-for our present purposes, anyway, Given that 
a possible world (universe) is a set of mutually compossible complete concepts, 
we might say that two individual substances sf and s, express (or, not to  beg the 
question, belong to) thesame universejust in case the concepts exemplified by 
them are mutually compossible. And this amounts to  saying, in turn, that, for 
any property 4, if 4 is a member of the concept exemplified by si (respectively, 
sl) then it is possible to deduce from the concept exemplified by ~~(respectively, 
s,) that 4 is a member of the concept exemplified by si(respectively, s i )  (Notice 
that the completeness of individual concepts would nor suffice to  characterize 
adequately the notion of "the same universe." For that two concepts ci and cj 
are complete is clearly no guarantee that they are mutually compossible-i.e., 
that from c, one can infer all the properties belonging to  cj, and conversely- 
and hence that, assuming ci andcj do indeed belong t o  a possible world, they 
do indeed belong to the same possible world.) 
The view that (universal) Harmony holds and the view that each individual 
substance expresses the same universe from its own point of view, then, can be 
explained in terms of the fact that the set of concepts exemplified by individual 
substances is a set of mutually compossible complete concepts. The very same 
fact makes it possible for (universal) Harmony to hold and for each individual 
substance to express the same universe. If this is so, both views can plausibly 
be regarded as natural offshoots of the mirroring principle for complete 
concepts: alternatively, that (universal) Harmony holds, and that each 
individual substance expresses the same universe, can plausibly be regarded 
as the analogue in actuality of the mirroring principle in the realm of possi- 
bility (i.e., as applied to  complete individual concepts rather than to  individual 
substances). 
In a rather puzzling and curious passage,20 however, Leibniz puts forth a 
view that is somewhat unlike any of the views I have ascribed to  him in the 
present section. He maintains that the claim that the nature of an individual 
(or "simple," as he puts it) substance is such that its "following state" is a 
consequence of the preceding one and the claim that the universe expressed 
(or "represented," as he puts it) by each individual substance is the same are 
intimately associated (if not interchangeable). Here is the passage: 
The nature of every s~mpfe substance, soul, o r  true monad being such that its following 
state IS a consequence of the preceding one, here now is the cause ofharmony found out. 
For God needs only to  make a simple substance become once and from the beginning a 
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representation of the universe according to its point of view, since from thence alone it 
follows that ~t will be so perpetually and that all slrnple substances will always have a 
harmony among themselves because they always represent the same universe. (L, 71 1-712 
-italics mine) 
The italicized material in the passage I have just quoted shows--conclusively, 
I should venture to say-that Leibniz did indeed regard as intimately asso- 
ciated the two claims I have described a couple of paragraphs back. The 
resulting view, as far as (universal) Harmony is concerned, is more or less the 
following: the nature of each individual substance's being such that "its 
following state is a consequence of the preceding one," (universal) Harmony 
holds. Alternatively, and equivalently (?): all individual substances'represent- 
ing (i.e., expressing) the same universe, (universal) Harmony holds. 
Assuming that the interpretation of the passage under present analysis is 
correct, the question now arises, Why should Leibniz regard as intimately 
associated the claim that the nature of each individual substance is such that 
"its following state is a consequence of the preceding onemand the claim that 
all individual substances express the same universe? The explanation is not 
hard to  find: he just took one of the two claims to provide some sort of 
"explication" for the other. 
Contrary to what might be expected,22 I take the "explicating"c1aim to  be 
the one dealing with the notion of expression (of the same universe by all 
individual substances); not the one deaIing with the nature of "simple" 
substances. (This I regard as obvious in view of the "For" in the passage 
under present analysis.) 
What I have in mind is something like the following: That the present state 
of each individual substance is a consequence of the preceding one is a conse- 
quence of-is to be understood in terms of-the fact that the universe expressed 
by each individual substance is the same. For clearly, if to say the latter is to 
say, in particular (cf. 50.3 above), that each individual substance exemplifies a 
compIete concept from which all of its properties, in particular, are derivable 
(and derivable precisely in the order in which it comes to possess them), then, 
in particular, the present state of each individual substance can be inferred 
from the preceding one-via the complete concept exemplified by the sub- 
stance in question. (This of course entails understanding-is a consequence o f '  
in terms of "can be inferredlderived from," which entails, in turn, that for the 
present state of a given substance to be a consequence of the preceding one is 
for the former to  be expressed by the latter.) 
(En passant, we might also notice that a minimal condition for its being the 
case that the universe expressed by all individual substances is the same is that 
the present state of each individual substance be a consequence of the pre- 
ceding one: this much at least appears to be implicit in the double-edged 
passage quoted in note 22 below, and to follow explicitly from what I have said 
in the previous paragraph. For if the present state of a given substance is not a 
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consequence of-that is, is not expressed by-the preceding one, then clearly 
the notion of "expressing the same universe" could not meaningfully be 
applied to it. This is one more instance, perhaps an unimportant one, of the 
Leibnizian "circle.") 
A couple of paragraphs back I claimed, and showed, that a tight connection 
obtains between the fact that each individual substance exemplifies a complete 
concept, and the fact that the present state of each individual substance is a 
consequence of its preceding state-would Leibniz have accepted such a 
view? I should be inclined to  claim that he would, especially if thefollowing- 
admittedly not conclusive-passages are taken into account: 
each of these [i.e.. ~ n d ~ v ~ s i b l e ]  substances contalns in Itsnature the laws by whtch theser~es 
of tts operations cont~nues, and all that has happened and will happen to it. (CA, 170) 
. ~n my optnlon it is in nature of created substance to change cont~nually followlnga 
certatn order whlch leads ~t . . through all the states which ~t encounters, In such a way 
that he who sees all things sees all ~ t s  past and future states In its present. And t h ~ s  law of 
order, whlch constitutes the individualtty of each particular substance, IS In exact agree- 
ment w~th  what occurs to every other substance and throughout the whole untverse ( L ,  493) 
It matters not that there is no explicit reference to  completeconcepts in the 
passages I have just quoted. For clearly, both what Leibniz calls the "law by 
which the series of its [i.e., a given individual substance's] operations continues" 
and what he calls the "law of order" not only underlie the view that the present 
state of a given individual substance is a consequence of the preceding one: 
they are also closely connected, as we have seen in G0.1 above, with the notion 
of a complete concept. Thus, for instance, the former is said by Leibniz to be 
contained in each individual substance's "nature," i.e., I take it, complete 
concept-or the counterpart, in each individual substance, to the complete 
concept exemplified by it. The "law of order," in turn, can plausibly be 
regarded as some sort of analogue, in each individual substance (see, e.g., L, 
500), of the complete concept exemplified by it. (Somewhat less plausibly, it 
might also be taken to be the complete concept itself: this becomes slightly 
more plausible if we understand the notion of "agreement" in terms of that of 
compossibility.) 
Complete concepts, then, do after all turn out to  be quite relevant to the 
view that the present state of each individual substance is a consequence of 
the preceding one. We are perfectlyjustified, therefore, in regarding the claim 
that the universe expressed by each individual substance is the same as an 
"explication" of the claim that the present state of each individual substance 
is a consequence of the preceding one. Can we also get the former from the 
latter claim, thereby "closing" the circle? Provided (1) we bring into the 
picture (the notion of) compossibility and (2) we regard the totality of "states" 
of a given individual substance as identical with the totality of its properties, 
the answer is affirmative: we certainly can-here is how. 
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We have seen earlier that the completeness of the concepts exemplified by 
a given substance s is what makes it possible for the present state of s to be a 
consequence of the preceding state of s: that is, there is a (unique) way of 
inferring the present state of s from its preceding state. If to completeness we 
now add compossibility, we will be in a position to infer from the preceding 
state of s not only the present state of s, but also the present state of all other 
existing individual substances. (This is a pretty obvious consequence of the 
way in which I have characterized the notion of compossibility in 90.2 above.) 
In a word: at each time in its history, s is  going to be an expression of the same 
universe that is expressed by all other existing individual substances. 
If this is so, (universal) Harmony can also be regarded as a consequence of 
the fact that the present state of each individual substance follows from the 
preceding state-together with the fact that the concept exemplified by a 
given individual substance is compossible (in the sense of "compossible" 
explained in 90.2 above) with the concepts exemplified by all other individual 
substances. We can go both ways, however (see, e.g., CA, 147): that is to  say, 
from the fact that Harmony (in some intuitive sense of "Harmony") holds we 
can infer the two facts just mentioned-especially if it is indeed the case that 
for (universal) Harmony to hold is for each individual substance to express 
the same universe, and conversely. 
I think it is about time to turn to a direct discussion and analysis of the 
Leibnizian "circle." Before doing that, however, I should like to say a few 
words on a distinction which will turn out to be of rather crucial importance 
t o  our subsequent discussion and analysis, and which I have only too briefly 
alluded to in 90.2 above. 
0.5. The two "levels." 
The theory of complete concepts and the notion of a complete concept; the 
notion of compossibility; the mirroring principle; the notion of connection; 
the notion of expression; and, finally, the doctrine of (universal) Harmony: it 
would be quite wrong to take all of these theories/ notions/ principles to be, as 
it were, of the same "type" (the same metaphysical "type," I mean), or to 
belong to the same (metaphysical) "level." There are two fundamental 
"levels" (or "types") to be distinguished here: the "level" of possibility 
(=conceive of our own world as possible, i.e., as a set s of mutually compos- 
sible complete concepts); and the "level" of actuality (=conceive of our own 
world as actual, i.e., as a set of individual substances exemplifying the 
concepts belonging to s). 
Given the theory of complete concepts, what takes place a t  the "level" of 
actuality could in principle be "read off' from the "level" of possibility: just 
look at the appropriate (set of mutually compossible) complete concepts, and 
you will be able to infer not only the entire history of our own world, but also a 
number of quite crucial properties of the latter-for instance, that (universal) 
Harmony holds in it; that all things in it are connected; that it isexpressed by 
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each individual substance inhabiting it (see however 50.5-0 below); and so on; 
and so forth. For obvious reasons (one of them being that a one-to-one 
correspondence obtains between the complete concepts belonging to the 
"level" of possibility and the individuals exemplifying them), there is some 
sort of trade-off between the two "levels": but one must be careful-it is a very 
delicate balance. 
For although what takes place at, and is true of, the "level" of actuality, is 
indeed determined by what is true of the "level" of possibility, in the sense that 
the former necessarily23 "mirrors" (exemplifies) the latter, what we may take 
to be true of the "level" of actuality-say, that the universe expressed by each 
individual substance is the same-may have a bearing on what we may take 
to be true of the "level" of possibility-say, that the concepts belonging to it 
are complete and mutually compossible (compossible worldwise, that is). 
That is, the picture we have of the "level" of actualityis bound to influence, to 
some extent at least, the picture we have of the "level" of possibility. (An 
analogous situation obtains in the philosophy of mathematics: 
If we have decided upon a mode1 of the meanings of mathematical statements according 
to which we have to repudiate a notion of truth considered as determinately attaching, or 
failing to attach, to  such statements independently of whether we can now, or  ever will be 
able to, prove or disprove them, then we shall beunable touse the picture of mathematical 
real~ty a s  external to  usand waiting to  bediscovered. Instead, we shall inev~tably adopt the 
picture of that reality a s  being the product of our thought, or, at  least, as  coming into 
existence only as ~t IS thought. Conversely, if we admit a notion of truth as attaching 
objectively to our mathematical statements independently of our knowledge, then, like- 
wise, the picture of mathematical reality asexisting, like thegalaxies, independently of our 
observation of it will force itself on us in an equally irresistible manner. But, when we 
approach the matter in this way, there is no puzzle over the interpretation of these metaphors: 
psychologically inescapable as they may be, their non-metaphorical content will conslst 
entirely In the two contrasting models of the meanings of mathemat~cal statements, and 
the issue between them will become simply the issue as to which of these two models 1s 
correct.24 
Dummett's "picture of mathematical reality" corresponds more or less to 
what I have called above the picture of the "level" of possibility: whereas his 
"model[s] of the meanings of mathematical statements" corresponds more or 
less to what I have called above the picture of the "level" of actuality. The 
parallel between the two cases is indeed rather striking: the other side of the 
coin, for which the parallel does not hold any more, will be described and 
discussed in §I below.) 
So much for the distinction between the two "levels." Let me now raise the 
question: What belongs to which of the two "levels'? Easy: whereas the notion 
of compossibility, as well as that of a complete concept, definitely beIong to 
the "level" of possibility, the theory of complete concepts itself may plausibly 
be regarded as the natural trait d'union between the two "levels"-which 
88 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
makes it somewhat neutral as far as membership in either of the two "levels" 
is concerned. Finally, the mirroring principle, as applied to complete concepts, 
clearly belongs to the "level" of possibility. 
The remaining notions (namely, expression and connection) and the 
doctrine of (universal) Harmony all belong to the "level" of actuality: this 
should almost go without saying. What should not go without saying, how- 
ever, is the fact that, gindeed what is true of the "level" of possibility deter- 
mines what is true of the "level" of actuality, then, in particular, that Harmony 
holds, that the universe expressed by each individual substance is the same, 
that all things are connected, etc., should be capable of being explained-or 
accounted for-in terms of what is true of the "level" of possibility. More 
specifically, it ought to be possible to  understand (as well as explain) the 
notions/doctrines/ theories belonging to the latter without reference to  the 
notions/doctrines/ theories belonging to the "level" of actuality. Let us see 
whether or not this can be done. 
1. The "circle" proper. 
S o  far, it must be admitted, not much of a "circle": just the contours, the 
main outlines, of a possible "circle." Here is how to make it actual-or 
plausible, as I should rather say. In the previous sections we have almost been 
able to "reduce" the mirroring principle, the doctrine of (universal) Harmony, 
the notion of expression, and that of connection to  the notions of a complete 
concept and compossibility. In particular, the view that each individual 
substance expresses the same universe was explained, and understood, in 
terms of the view that the set of concepts exemplified by individualsubstances 
is a set of mutually compossible complete concepts. Things, however, as we 
shall presently see, are not a t  all as simple as that: at least one variation must 
be allowed for. Thus consider the following two quite intriguing passages: 
You seem to have rightly grasped my doctrine of how every body whatever expresses all 
other things, and how every soul or entelechy whatever expresses its own body and through 
it all other things. But when you have uncovered the full force of thisdoctrine, youwill find 
that I have said nothing else which does not follow from it. (L, 531) 
. . . once it has been established that each monad represents[i.e., expresses] the universe, 
what remains (le reste) are nothing but consequences. ( G P  111, 465) 
If we take the passages I have just quoted at face value, and if, further, we 
explain (and understand) the notion of expression (of the same universe by all 
individual substances) in terms of the notions of completeness and compossi- 
bility (of concepts), we find ourselves right in the midst of the Leibnizian 
"circlev-the "circle" proper, I mean. For it turns out that we have now to 
explain (and understand) the notions of completeness and compossibility (of 
concepts), in particular, in terms of the notion of expression (of the same 
universe by all individual substances). 
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Whether or not the two passages quoted above can be explained away,25 it 
is indeed the case that it is possible to  go bath ways-from completeness and 
compossibility to expression, and from expression (regarded now as an 
ultimate metaphysical fact about the to completeness and compossi- 
bility. This is the general picture: and here are its main features. 
The notion of expression (of the same universe by all individual substances) 
is the counterpart in actuality to  the notions of completeness and compossi- 
bility in the realm of possibility, and conversely: there is no reason to regard 
either of them-whether expression or compossibility and completeness-as 
metaphysically dependent upon the other (cf. for instance L, 524-525). That 
is: the view that each individual substance exemplifies a complete concept 
which is compossible with the concepts exemplified by all other individual 
substances makes sense, and can be made sense of, only insofar as it makes 
sense to claim that the universe expressed by each individual substance is the 
same-especially if the notion of a "constant and fixed relationship" involved 
in Leibniz's definition of "expression" is understood in terms of deducibility 
(and Leibniz's theory of truth is eventually brought into the picture). That is: 
if it is indeed the case that the concepts exemplified by individual substances 
are complete and mutually compossible, then each individual substance is 
bound to express the same universe (and Harmony holds); if, on the other 
hand, each individual substance expresses the same universe (and Harmony 
holds), then the concepts exemplified by individual substances are bound to 
be complete and mutually compossible. 
(In a desperate effort to break out of the "circle," we might claim, taking a 
hint from Dummett, that, in the order of recognition, the view that each 
individual substance expresses the same universe is primary, whereas in the 
order of explanation the view that the concepts exemplified by individual 
substances are complete and mutually compossible, is itself primary. This, 
however, would only make the "circle" proper slightly less conspicuous: it 
would not get rid of it, since obviously the two orders can be reversed-what 
is primary in the order of recognition may well be regarded as primary in the 
order of explanation, and what is primary in the order of explanation may 
well be regarded as primary in the order of recognition.) 
As Leibniz might well have said, there is a perfect "harmony" between the 
two "levels": just as we explain why each individual substance expresses the 
same universe by saying that each individual substance exemplifies a complete 
concept which is compossible with the concepts exemplified by all other 
individual substances; so we explain why actual individual substances 
exemplify mutually compossible complete concepts by saying that all of them 
express the same ~niverse.2~ In other words: the completeness and mutual 
compossibility of the concepts exemplified by individ7;dl substances is 
accounted for in terms of the fact that all individual substances express the 
same universe; and conversely, the fact that all actual individual substances 
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express the same universe is accounted for in terms of the completeness and 
mutual compossibility of the concepts exemplified by the substances in 
question. 
This, I should like to suggest, is the most important and interesting aspect 
of the Leibnizian "circle": actually, the "circle" proper. But it is not the whole 
story, For we might want to  step out of the "circ1e"and see whether or not it is 
possible to  find some sort of "neutral" motivation for its components. Here is 
a plausible suggestion: what underlies the view that all individual substances 
express the same universe, and the view that the concepts they exemplify are 
complete, is Leibniz's definition of truth28 (as containment of the concept of 
the predicate in that of the subject), and hence, indirectly, the principle of 
sufficient reason. (As I have shown elsewhere,29 an account of truth, not 
necessarily the only one, which appears to  be consistent with-and in a sense 
to  "vindicatew- the principle of sufficient reason is an account in which truth 
is characterized in terms of containment or deducibility, And conversely, the 
main, if not the only, reason for holding the principle in question is Leibniz's 
very characterization of truth in terms of containment or  deducibility.) 
Lest it be thought that the above suggestion enables us to get rid of the 
"circle" proper, the following two crucial facts ought to be taken into account. 
First, there is no way of inferring (the notion of) compossibility from Leibniz's 
definition of truth taken by itself. And second, the latter, taken by itself, does 
not entail the view that all individual substances express the same universe: it 
must be supplemented with the notion of connection(whose task is to provide 
us with the totality of truths about the universe expressed by a given substance, 
as Leibniz himself implicitly acknowledges in DM, 13), and with that of "the 
same universe," whose explication (as we have seen in $0.4 above) involves the 
notion of compossibility. 
Even though Leibniz's definition of truth does not provide a satisfactorily 
"neutral" motivation for each of the members of the "circle," however, it goes 
some way toward explaining why we have that kind of "circ1e"rather than an 
altogether different kind (this applies to  the circular design of 50.5-0 below as 
well). For the main component of that definition is the notion of deducibility 
(or containment) of the concept of the predicate from (in) that of the subject: 
and that notion is the common denominator, we might say, not only of the 
two views I have just been talking about, but also of the members of the 
"family" (connection, compossibility, mirroring principle, and universal 
Harmony). That the "family"-inclusive of the "circle" proper- is structured 
in the way it is structured and not in a different way, is essentially due to 
Leibniz's definition of truth: not, mind you, that there is a "family" which 
turns upon itself, but that there is a "family" of that sort-indeed, this appears 
to be a fairly straightforward consequence of the fact that truth is characterized 
by Leibniz in terms of deducibility (or containment). And here we have- 
perhaps-the sort of "neutral" motivation we were after. 
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So much for the"circlew proper. I should now like to "turn" the "circle" into 
a grand circular design: to show, in other words, that most, if not all, of the 
notions/doctrines, etc., I have been talking about so far are tightly inter- 
connected-that each of them sends you around to (some if not all of) the 
remaining ones; that none of them has a right to be regarded as metaphysically 
primary (except perhaps for the notion of a complete concept); that what is 
really metaphysically primary is the circular design itself. 
0.5-0. The "family." 
The same, or roughly the same, counterpoint that obtains between the view 
that the concepts exemplified by individual substances are complete and 
mutually compossible, and the view that each individual substance expresses 
the same universe, obtains between the mirroring principle and Leibniz's view 
that all things (hence, in particular, all individual substances) are connected. 
We can start from the mirroring principle (regarded as a principle to the effect 
that from the properties included in a given complete concept c it is possible to 
deduce all the properties included in the complete concepts which are com- 
possible with c), and then regard the view that all things are connected as some 
sort of analogue, in the actual world (=at the "level" of actuality), of the 
mirroring principle itself. Or else, we can start from the view that all things are 
connected and argue from it to the mirroring principle: since all things (in 
particular, all individual substances) are connected, the (complete) concepts 
exemplified by them must allow for something equivalent (if not identical) to 
the principle in question. We can go both ways: it is because the mirroring 
principle holds that all things are connected; it is because all things are con- 
nected that the mirroring principle must hold.30 
Next, if the view that all things are connected requires for its truth some- 
thing like the mirroring principle for complete concepts, it will also require 
that the concepts exemplified by individual substances be mutually compos- 
sible. For, it will be recalled (cf. 90.2 above), compossibility turns out to be a 
crucial factor in making mirroring possible. That is, one of the reasons for 
employing the notion of compossibility is the role it plays in the "proof'of the 
mirroring principle itself. This being so, the view that all things are connected 
sends you around, via the mirroring principle, to compossibility-and 
conversely, again via the mirroring principle (specifically, via the claim that, 
since all things are connected, the mirroring principIe must hold). 
The next obvious step is to get rid of the mirroring principle itself, regarded 
purely as a trait d'union between the notion of compossibi1ity and that of 
connection, and see how the former fares vis-h-vis the latter. Once more, it is 
possible to go both ways. We can regard the view that all things are connected 
as metaphysically ultimate, and argue from it to the view that the concepts 
exemplified by individual substances must be at least mutually compossible. 
Or else we can regard as metaphysically ultimate the view that the concepts 
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exemplified by individual substances are (at least) mutually compossible, and 
argue from it to the view that all things are connected. 
Next, as we have already seen in $0.3 above: there can be no connections 
between individual substances, unless the universe expressed by each indi- 
vidual substance is the same. But the notion of "the same universe" (a) can be 
made sense of in terms of that of compossibility (cf. $0.4 above) and (b) is 
intimately connected, via the notion of compossibility, with the mirroring 
principle, which, in turn, is itself intimately connected with the notion of 
compossibility. And again we are sent around, in a rather devious way, to the 
notion of connection.31 
Next, the notion of connection appears to  be responsible, at  least in part 
and somewhat indirectly, for the doctrine of (universal) Harmony: here is 
how. First, for (universal) Harmony to hold, and for the universe expressed 
by each individual substance to be the same, is, it will be recalled, one and the 
same thing. Next, since connection can plausibly be regarded (as I have 
suggested in $0.3 above) as a very special sort of expression, the notion of 
connection comes to  be explained and accounted for in terms of that of 
expression. That is, it must be the case that each substance expresses the same 
universe (and hence that Harmony holds) in order for its being the case that 
all things are connected: there would be no connections between things if the 
situation I have described on p. 8 1 were to obtain. 111 this sense it makes sense, 
I take it, toclaim that the notion ofconnectionis somehow responsible for the 
doctrine of (universal) Harmony. 
Now, however, consider the following passages: 
each tndtvtdual substance is an expression of the whole universe, . . through the connexion 
that exlsts between all things. . . . (CA ,  57-~talics mine; see also CA, 44) 
, . .[the soul] expresses the whole universe in a certaln sense, and in particular according 
to the connexlon between other bodies and its own, for tt cannot equally well express 
everything. (CA ,  11 3 )  
. . . stnce everything is connected becauseof the plenitude of the world,. . . rt follows that 
each monad . . . represents[i.e., expresses] the universe accordrng to its point of vlew. ( L ,  
637-rtal~cs mlne; see also C, 15) 
This completely reverses the picture. The situation we seem to be facing 
now is more or less the following: connection is not a t  all a special (or even a 
very special) kind of expression; the latter is not to be used in order to explain 
what makes the former possible. Rather, sense must be made of the fact that 
individual substances express the same universe, and hence that (universal) 
Harmony holds, by saying that all of them are connected-which implies, in 
view of $1 above, that Leibniz's requirement that the conceptsexemplified by 
actual individual substances be complete, is a consequence of his view that all 
things are connected. Once more, the notion of connection turns out to be 
"metaphysically ultimate" (at  the "level" of actuality, that is: "Now this 
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mutual connection or accommodation of all created things to each other and 
of each to all the rest causes each simple substance to have relations which 
express all the others and consequently to be a perpetual living mirror of the 
universe" [L, 648; see also GP  VII, 3 16-3 171). Once more, however, we can go 
both ways: take the notion of expression as our starting point (as "meta- 
physically ultimate," that is, at the "level" of actuality), and proceed to deduce 
from it that of connection; or else, turning things upside down, take the notion 
of connection as our starting point, and proceed to deduce from it that of 
expression as well as that of completeness-plus the doctrine of (universal) 
Harmony. 
Either way, the notion of compossibility and the mirroring principle wiIl 
sooner or later enter the picture as well (very likely via the theory of complete 
concepts), and play in it different roles, depending on whether expression or 
connection is taken as our starting point. And conversely: given either the 
notion of compossibility (together with that of completeness) or the mirroring 
principle (as applied to complete concepts, rather than to the individual 
substances exemplifying them), the view that all things are connected and the 
view that the universe expressed by each individual substance is the same (and 
hence the doctrine of universal Harmony) will sooner or later enter the 
picture as well, and play in it different roles depending on whether the notion 
of compossibility or the mirroring principle is taken as one's starting point 
(as "metaphysica1Iy ultimate," that is, a t  the "level" of possibility). 
At this point a number of variations on the same theme are possible. For 
instance, from the views that all things are connected and that each individual 
substance exemplifies a complete concept, we can derive the view that each 
individual substance expresses the same universe. Or else, from the views that 
each individual substance expresses the same, and hence the whole, universe, 
and that the concept exemplified by it is compossible with the concepts 
exemplified by the remaining substances, we can derive the view that the 
concepts in question are complete. Or  else, from the view that each individual 
substance exemplifies a complete concept and from the mirroring principle 
(as applied to complete concepts), we can derive the view that all things are 
connected. Or else, from the views that all things are connected and that each 
individual substance expresses the whole universe, we can derive the notion 
of compossibility and the view that each individual substance exemplifies a 
complete concept. Or else . . . . 
So  a tight, intimate connection obtains not only between the various 
notions, doctrines, principles, etc., I have been discussing so far, but also 
between the "level" of actuality and that of possibility: these are the main 
outlines of the grand circular design I have alluded to at the end of the previous 
section. There is, however, a "neutral" standpoint from which it is possible to 
look at the design without being trapped into it: Leibniz's definition of truth32 
and the principle of sufficient reason-which, as I have pointed out above, are 
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in turn intimately connected, and provide the ultimate foundation for the 
design (together, I should perhaps add, with Leibniz's views on what it is for 
monads to  perceive an "independently" existing universe). 
Perhaps a way may be found of making use of that definition and of that 
principle so as  to reconstruct a design which is not circular. Perhaps, on the 
other hand, there is no real de'nouement to the story. Perhaps it is just wrong 
to look for something like a "deductive"system in Leibniz's writings. Perhaps 
what I have said so far is one more proof-if need be-that life is indeed a 
floating opera. (But this is the topic for a paper of an altogether different kind.) 
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26. As Leibniz himself points out in a letter to Jaquelot, "The miracle or rather the wonder 
consists in this, that eachsubstance isa representation[~.e.,an expression] of theuniverseaccord- 
ing to its p o ~ n t  of view. This is the greatest richness or perfection one can attribute to creatures 
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known that all things are connecred in each one of the possible worlds" (GP VI, 107). 
31. Just recall that ~t is because all things are connected that the mirroring pr~nciple must 
hold; that compossibility IS a n  essential component of what makes mrrrorlng possible; and that 
the vlew that all thingsare connected leads to thev~ew that theconcepts exemplrfied by individual 
substances are at least mutually compossible. 
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the question what is the appropr~ate notion of truth for the sentences of our language," "The 
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